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Royal H. Brin, Jr.*
I. AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
"eExcess" and "Escape" Clauses. In a case of first impression in Texas,
the question of determining liability when the provisions of a family auto-
mobile and a garage liability policy conflict was decided by Hardware
Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.' A
collision had occurred while Anita Kay Hyde, whose father had a family
automobile liability policy with Farmers, was test driving an automobile
owned by Frizzell Pontiac, Inc. and insured by Hardware. The Farmers
policy provided that it would pay only the excess above any other valid
and collectible insurance, while the Hardware policy provided that if there
was any other insurance available it would not apply at all. In this situa-
tion other jurisdictions have reached differing results. Some have held in
favor of the driver's insurer,' some in favor of the garage liability insurer,"
and others have held that since the excess clause in one policy and the escape
clause in the other are irreconcilable, both are disregarded and liability is
apportioned pro rata."
The Houston court of civil appeals recognized that the clauses in the
two policies were irreconcilable, but on the basis of "total policy insuring
intent" and in light of the primary risks of the respective policies, de-
termined that Hardware, the garage liability insurer, would be primarily
liable with Farmers liable only for the excess. However, the Texas supreme
court determined that the repugnancy between the policy provisions could
best be solved by ignoring both Hardware's escape clause and Farmer's
excess clause, thus reaching the desirable result of furnishing the insured
maximum coverage. The loss was therefore prorated between the two car-
riers.'
The Texas Legislature has since entered the picture by Senate Bill 35,
passed by both houses and signed by the Governor on September 19,
1969." This statute expressly authorizes the escape clause in a garage policy
and further provides that "[n]otwithstanding any provision to the con-
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Rowland Foster in the preparation of this Article.
'444 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969).
'See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 34 Ill. 2d
424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 239 Md. 421, 212 A.2d
96 (1965).
'See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Suttenfield, 236 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1956); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Weekes, 74 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1954); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co.,
415 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 269
N.C. 354, 152 S.E.2d 445 (1967); Faltersack v. Vanden Boogaard, 39 Wis. 2d 64, 158 N.W.2d 322
(1968).
4See, e.g., Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir.
1952).
' Haadware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 437 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston), rev'd, 444 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969).
6 Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 35, at 137.
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trary in such other policy or policies of insurance as to whether such in-
surance is primary, excess, or contingent insurance, or otherwise, such
other valid and collectible insurance shall be primary insurance as to the
garage customer."7 This Act, however, by its own terms applies only to
policies issued, renewed or made subject to the Act by endorsement after
its effective date.
Contribution vs. Subrogation: The Hicks Rule. On the same day as the
Farmers decision, the supreme court handed down another opinion dealing
with conflicts between liability carriers. Employers Casualty Co. v. Trans-
port Insurance Co.' appears to be of even greater importance for the future,
particularly in view of the legislative action in the garage-family auto-
mobile carrier situation. Transport insured Hunsaker Truck Lease, Inc.,
which leased a truck to Prior Products, Inc., insured by Employers
Casualty. The truck collided with a car occupied by the Siegels, who sued
Prior Products. Transport was tendered the defense but denied coverage
and refused to defend. Employers assumed the defense and negotiated
settlement and then sued Transport for reimbursement of all or part of
the amount paid. Both policies had pro rata clauses. The Waco court of
civil appeals' held that since the contracts of insurance were "several and
independent of each other," the insurer was liable for only a portion of
the loss, but having paid the full loss, was not entitled to contribution
from the other insurer under the Texas supreme court opinion of Traders
Cq General Insurance Co. v. Hicks Rubber Co.10
In affirming the civil appeals judgment the Texas supreme court de-
clined to overrule Hicks, but nevertheless pointed the way to a detour
around it. The court said that Hicks remains the proper rule of decision
in strictly contribution cases: if each of several insurers is liable for only
a proportion of a loss, none of them has the right to pay more than its pro-
portion and then recover contribution from the others. The court pro-
ceeded to hold, however, that a pro rata insurer who paid the entire loss
did have a remedy for recovery of a pro rata part from another insurer by
proceeding upon the theory of contractual or conventional subrogation to
the rights of the insured. Thus, Hicks was theoretically preserved but
practically destroyed as far as its future effect is concerned. 1 An insurer
in the position of Employers Casualty need only remember to proceed by
way of subrogation rather than contribution.
Hicks was also mentioned in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Pan American Insurance Co." State Farm's insured and his wife
were injured when their car caught fire while being filled with butane gas
by a butane company employee:. Pan American, the insurer of the butane
444 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1969).
'Transport Ins.. Co. v. Employers Cas. Co., .434 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968),
aff'd, 444 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1969).
10 140 Tex. 586, 169 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1943).
"The dissenting opinion by Justice Steakley, joined by Justices Greenhill and Reavley, would
have overruled the Hicks case outright. 444 S.W.2d at 611-14.
1437 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1969).
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company, settled with the two injured people and then sued State Farm to
recover the amount paid, contending that the employee refueling the
automobile became an additional insured under the State Farm policy
which obligated it to pay damages "arising out of the ownership, mainten-
ance, or use" of the vehicle. The supreme court held that although refuel-
ing constituted "maintenance" within the insuring clause, the butane
company employee was not covered under the omnibus provision which
covered any person "using" the vehicle with the permission of the named
insured. The court held that the "conspicuous omission" of the term
"maintenance" in the omnibus provision denoted an intent to exclude
persons whose only connection with the vehicle was for the purpose of
maintenance. The concurring opinion" considered that the court had gone
out of its way to restrict the meaning of "using" in the omnibus clause
and that this was a case of two pro rata insurers governed by the Hicks
rule that "the company which pays more than its proportionate part can-
not recover the excess from the other insurer.""
Settlements. In McGuire v. Commercial Union Insurance Co." the su-
preme court considered the effect of a settlement in a prior wrongful
death action by a widow on behalf of herself and her children for the
death of her husband. In response to the widow's petition in the prior
action, defendant answered and also filed a counterclaim for personal in-
juries. On the same day, the court severed the counterclaim from the
original action and later approved a compromise settlement of the widow's
wrongful death claim. This was done without the consent of the deceased
driver's insurer, which then brought an action seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that it was not required to defend the counterclaim against the
estate of its insured because the widow, in settling her wrongful death
action and agreeing that the counterclaim could still be maintained and
would not be prejudiced thereby, had deprived the insurer of the compul-
sory counterclaim defense it might otherwise have had. The Amarillo court
of civil appeals agreed,'" but the supreme court held that the insurer did
have a duty to defend against the counterclaim and that the widow's
settlement and agreed judgment had neither prejudiced the deceased
driver's insurer nor deprived it of an otherwise available defense.
Declaratory Judgments. In Great American Insurance Co. v. Murray7
the court held that the limits of a liability policy were not discoverable
under rule 167' in an insurer's declaratory judgment action as to liability
coverage of underlying suits for personal injuries and death, since the
damages sought in the underlying suits adequately supplied the requisite
13id. at 545-46.
14 Id. at 546.
'5431 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1968).
"rCommercial Union Ins. Co; v." Pryor, 423 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo" 1967),
rev'd, 431 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1968).
17437 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 1969).
18 TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.
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jurisdictional amount for district court. The Murray opinion also indicates
that it continues to be the law in Texas that the amount of insurance
coverage is not material in tort litigation. Firemans Insurance Co. v. Burch"
put some limitations upon the role of declaratory judgment actions in
determining coverage disputes. The court held that the question of the
automobile liability carrier's duty to defend presented a justiciable issue,
but it was further held that the district court should not attempt to
declare the liability of the carrier upon various possible judgments that
might be rendered in the personal injury action itself, since that would
be purely advisory in nature and beyond the power and jurisdiction of
the district court.
Newly Acquired Automobiles. Two civil appeals cases considered insur-
ance provisions regarding a newly acquired automobile. In one' the court
held that under a provision which extended coverage to newly acquired
automobiles if notice was given to the insurer within thirty days of de-
livery, the fact that the purchaser had to enter a second installment sales
contract when the credit of the co-signers of the first contract was dis-
approved did not extend the time for giving notice so as to provide cover-
age for an accident more than thirty days after delivery but less than
thirty days after the signing of the second contract. In the second case 1
summary judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed on the ground
that coverage was not extended under the newly acquired automobile
provision when the certificate of title was in the name of the insured but
the beneficial ownership was actually in another.
Uninsured Motorist Clause. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wallace" a re-
cent divorcee, while a guest in the automobile of another, was injured in
a collision with an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. The civil
appeals court held that the former wife was not an insured under an auto-
mobile policy issued in her former husband's name so as to be protected
under the uninsured motorist clause, even though the policy had been
purchased with community funds before the divorce and while the couple
resided in the same household.
Carpenter v. North River Insurance Co." dealt with arbitration under
uninsured motorist coverage. Although the Texas General Arbitration
Act' by its terms does not apply to insurance policy disputes, Carpenter
held that common law arbitration of such disputes was not foreclosed.
The court decided that under common law an agreement to arbitrate may
be revoked by either party at any time before the award is made, but that
the record did not conclusively show that the insurer had revoked its
agreement to arbitrate.
1 442 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1968).
20 Pride v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 434 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
2 Cook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 436 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968).
22435 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968).
23436 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
4
TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-38 (1959).
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Automobile Business Exclusion. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Universal Un-
derwriters Insurance Co.' affirmed a summary judgment in favor of a
garage liability irisurer in its action against an automobile owner's liability
insurer. The action had been instituted to recover the amount the garage
insurer had paid in settlement of a claim by a party injured in a collision
with the owner's automobile at a time while it was being driven by a
garage employee to the shop for repairs. The omnibus provision of the
family automobile policy excluded coverage while the automobile was be-
ing "used in the automobile business" which, in turn, was defined as "the
business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, or parking
automobiles." The court noted that this exclusion was based on the char-
acter of the use being made at the time, not on the character of the busi-
ness of the person using it, and concluded that driving the car to the shop
for repairs did not constitute use in the automobile business.
Tindall Pontiac, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." was a suit by a
garage against the insurer of a family automobile serviced by the garage.
The garage sought reimbursement of the sum paid in settlement of a
third party claim for damages arising from a collision which occurred
while the car was being driven from the service department of the garage
to its new car make-ready department. The court recognized the distinc-
tion between the two kinds of clauses mentioned in the Allstate case and
pointed out that while the Texas Standard Policy formerly was in terms of
use in the excluded business, the policy form had been changed and now
excluded coverage of the owned automobile while being used by any person
"while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile
business." It was held that the accident here occurred while the garage was
servicing the car and that the exclusion therefore did apply.
Comprehensive Automobile Liability. In a suit for medical payments,
statutory penalty, and attorney's fees' by the insured whose son had been
injured in an automobile accident, the comprehensive automobile liability
policy contained four insurance contracts with a limit of $2,000 for medi-
cal payments covering each of four automobiles owned by the insured.
The insured, having incurred medical expenses in the amount of $2,612.37,
claimed that he was entitled to the full $2,000 limit under each contract,
thus totalling $8,000, plus the statutory penalty of twelve per cent of
the $8,000 sum. It was held, however, that the comprehensive policy was
one of indemnity and that the insured's proper recovery was $2,612.37,
together with twelve per cent of that amount as penalty and the attorney's
fees determined in the trial court.
Homeowner's Liability. The exclusion in homeowners' policies of liability
coverage for intentional injuries was considered in National Union Fire
25439 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
26441 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969), error dismissed.
27Harlow v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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Insurance Co. v. Bourn.' In a prior action against the insureds, the jury
found that not only had each insured made an assault and battery upon
plaintiff, but each also acted in concert with others in so doing and
negligently failed to restrain the others from committing an assault. After
obtaining judgment in the first action, plaintiff brought suit against the
defendants' insurers under their homeowners' policies and urged that the
findings of negligence in the first suit were conclusive, the insurers having
defended under reservations of rights. The court held that the former
negligence findings were not binding, since the companies could not have
contested the issue with their insureds in the very case in which they were
defending the insureds, and that the assaults were in fact intentional, so
that there was no recovery against the insurers.
Stowers Doctrine. Ramifications of the Stowers doctrine" came into play
in two federal cases arising in Texas. In the first,' Transit Casualty had
refused to settle within its $5,000 policy limits in a suit against its insured,
and judgment was subsequently rendered for $51,375. The insured exe-
cuted a note for the amount of the judgment to the judgment creditor
and paid $5 as an initial payment thereon, and also executed an assign-
ment to the judgment creditor of her cause of action against the insurer
for negligent failure to settle within the policy limits. The insured and
the judgment creditor then brought suit against the insurer. It was held
that the insurer's negligent failure to settle within the policy limits was a
proximate cause of the entry of judgment against the insured. The court
recognized the Texas rule that payment by the insured is necessary for a
subsequent recovery against the negligent insurer under the Stowers doc-
trine and held that the note given to the judgment creditor was not bona
fide and did not constitute such necessary payment. However, it was held
that the insured did have a valid cause of action not only for recovery of
the $5 which had been paid, but also for a declaratory judgment that
Transit would be liable for any and all future amounts paid by the in-
sured on the original judgment.
The question of when limitations begin to run in a Stowers situation was
considered in Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana v. Jernigan,1
and it was held that the date or dates when the insured made payment
controlled, rather than the date when the claim was reduced to judgment.
A previous suit by the insured for the full excess had failed because the
original judgment had not been paid." Thereafter, the insured's attorney
secured a loan of $10,000 and used it to make part payment to the judg-
ment creditor on the $270,000 judgment, and initiated a new suit against
the insurer. This was more than two years after the original judgment, but
it was: held that since prepayment was essential, the cause of action did not
"8441 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
29 Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15. S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
.Transit Cas. Co. v. Smith, 410 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969).
31410 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1969).
"Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965).
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accrue until such prepayment was made. Declaratory judgment as to
future payments was likewise held proper. Consequently, Jernigan and
Smith, if accepted by the state courts, virtually emasculate the requirement
of prepayment.
II. LIFE, HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Conditional Receipts. The effect of a conditional receipt was considered
in National Life &. Accident Insurance Co. v. Blagg.' The deceased had
applied for a life insurance policy and paid the first premium, receiving
in return a conditional receipt, but died before any policy was issued.
Upon suit by the widow, the supreme court reaffirmed its earlier holding
in United Founders Life Insurance Co. v. Carey' that conditional receipts
provide for temporary life insurance to become effective on the date of
completion of the applicant's medical examination if in the opinion of
the company's authorized officers he was on that date insurable and accept-
able according to the terms of their receipt. The Blagg court went on to
hold that there were therefore three different ways by which the widow
could recover in this kind of situation: (1) by obtaining a fact finding
that in the opinion of the officers of the company the applicant was insur-
able and acceptable on the date of the completion of his medical exami-
nation; (2) by obtaining a fact finding that the determination that the
applicant was uninsurable was not made in good faith and that a reason-
ably prudent officer acting in good faith under the available evidence
would find that the applicant on the date of his examination was insurable
and acceptable under the company's rules and practices; or (3) by obtain-
ing fact findings that the company arbitrarily refused to form an opinion
after the applicant's death and that a reasonably prudent underwriter
under similar circumstances would have formed the opinion that he was
insurable.
Insurance Agents and Employees. Two civil appeals decisions emphasize
the inability of certain agents and employees to bind an insurance com-
pany. One held that where the agent knowingly and deliberately assisted
in the falsification of an application for life insurance, the company was
entitled to cancellation of the policy after the death of the insured because
of the false statements in the application.' In holding that there was no
waiver or estoppel, it was pointed out that the policy itself provided that
no agent should have the power to waive, change or alter any of the
terms or conditions and that article 21.04 of the Texas Insurance Code 6
provides that a soliciting agent "shall not have the power to waive, change
or alter any of the terms or conditions of the application or policy." The
other case held that an employee had no authority to sign a form letter
33438 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1969).
34 363 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. 1962).
'Bennett v. Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 438 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969),
error dismissed.
I'Tx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.04 (1963).
1970]
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on the insurer's letterhead extending the grace period." The employee was
in the accounting department, which the parties stipulated was authorized
to handle only billing, collection and receipt of premium payments, re-
cording of these payments, deposit of premium payment checks and clear-
ing of returned checks, and correspondence concerning those matters. The
court found that this stipulation negated authority of this employee to
extend the grace period or to waive forfeiture for nonpayment. It was
also noted that the policy provided that only specified officers could waive
any condition or extend the time for premium payment or change or
modify the policy, and that the accounting employee was not such an
officer.
Group Policies. A number of cases dealt with group policies, but most
of the results appear not particularly affected by the group nature of the
insurance. In General American Life Insurance Co. v. Williams' the
named beneficiary could not recover under a group life policy although
the insured had become totally disabled prior to death, because he had failed
to give notice of such disability to the insurer to bring about a waiver of
premium payment, and the policy had lapsed for nonpayment. The court
held that the insured was not relieved from giving such notice because of
temporary periods of mental incompetence and that the beneficiary was
barred by failure to file proof of loss within one year as required by the
policy.
Another case' concerned a group accident policy covering loss which
"resulted directly, and independently of all other causes, from bodily in-
juries . ..sustained solely through accidental means."'  The insured died
as the result of asphixiation due to aspiration of vomitous material. The
court held that the beneficiary was entitled to recover and that the aspira-
tion resulting in death was an accidental injury within the meaning of
the policy, although it indicated that the result might have been different
if the insuring clause had been in terms of "external means" rather than
accidental bodily injury.
Oliver v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co.4' was a suit to recover medical
expenses under a group policy which excluded coverage for "accidental
injury arising out of employment for compensation or profit or disease
entitling the insured to benefits under Workmen's Compensation, or any
similar law." Plaintiff, a plastering contractor, was injured when he fell
from a scaffold at a job site. It was held that the injury had occurred while
he was actively at work in his own employment for compensation and
therefore was not covered.
"
7 Ford v. Petroleum Life Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968), error ref.
n.r.e.
3'433 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968), error dismissed.
8 Jones v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error
ref. n.r.e.4 ld. at 722.




In a case involving a group policy which had been converted into an
individual policy,' summary judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed.
Plaintiff's husband procured health insurance on himself and his family
through a group policy at his place of employment. Upon his death plain-
tiff obtained a converted individual family health policy on herself and
her children, arrangements being made by the former employer who told
plaintiff that the benefits would be the same as under the group policy.
However, the individual policy actually issued did not contain major
medical coverage which had been included in the group policy. Plaintiff's
daughter was injured in an automobile accident and the insurer refused
to pay major medical benefits. Plaintiff urged that the employer should be
considered the insurer's agent, with the insurer being bound by his repre-
sentations. The court noted that authorities in other jurisdictions are
divided on the question of whether an employer acts as agent of the in-
surer or of the employees in connection with a group insurance policy, but
found it unnecessary to pass on that point since the court was persuaded
that if the employer were acting as the insurer's agent, "he could at most
be considered only a limited or special agent, analogous to soliciting agent.
As such he would not have authority to bind appellee as to risk, coverage
or waiver of conditions."
Determining Proper Beneficiaries. In Jackson v. Gibraltar Life Insurance
Co. of America4 the insured's mother was named a primary beneficiary,
but the wife claimed that the insured had intended that she be the primary
beneficiary with the mother as contingent beneficiary in the event the
wife did not survive her husband. The court held that there could not be
a mutual mistake, since the insurance company was not a party to the
mistake, and affirmed the summary judgment against the wife. Another
case' dealt with a widow's claim that her husband's attempts to change the
beneficiary in eight policies were ineffective. It was held that even though
the insured, prior to his death, mailed forms to his attorney to pass on to
the insurers, requesting change of the beneficiary in his life policies, the
attorney's agency and power to act had terminated with the insured's
death. Since the forms had not been sent to the insurers for the required
endorsement prior to the insured's death, there had not been substantial
compliance with the stated method for changing beneficiaries, and the
attempted changes were therefore ineffective.
Construing Policy Provisions. In construing a policy a number of cases
followed the approach of resolving any doubts against the insurer. A
rider amending a health insurance policy by providing indemnity for all
waiting periods for surgery was held to have also covered the waiting
period for hospital, medical and anesthesia expenses "because they were
'Harrison v. Travelers Ins. Co., 442 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
4Id. at 404.
4435 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968).
"'Witt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 440 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969).
1970]
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reasonably necessary incidents of the surgery.""' Under a policy covering
"hospital expense actually incurred," it was held that expenses actually
had been incurred so as to make the insurer liable, even though the hos-
pital had not been paid at the time of trial and it appeared that the work-
men's compensation of the insured's employer would probably be liable for
such expense.' The reductions clause which limited benefits of an accident
policy was held to apply only to a pre-existing condition involving the
back, the court stating that degenerative changes due to the aging process
did not constitute such a pre-existing condition, so that the insured was
entitled to full disability benefits."5
A federal case dealing with a Texas accidental death policy held that
lay evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the insured's death in
a collision was caused by accidental means, and further held that the re-
fusal of the beneficiary to allow an autopsy after interment was not a
defense, the policy provision being construed to mean that autopsy must
be demanded by the insurer and performed prior to interment or within a
reasonable time after notice of the death."
However, where the plain and unambiguous language of the policy
favored the insurer, it was enforced. Thus, in Fruhman v. Nawcas Benevo-
lent Auxiliary,5 where the policy provided that retirement benefits paid
the policy holder during his lifetime should be deducted from the death
benefits and the total amount of retirement benefits paid exceeded the
amount of the death benefits, it was held that the beneficiary under the
policy was entitled to no recovery.
III. FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
Liquidated Demand. In Houston Fire L Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Nichols" the supreme court reversed both lower courts and held that com-
plete destruction by fire of two piles of insured cotton burrs did not
automatically entitle the insured to the face amount of the policy regard-
less of the actual loss sustained. It was noted that article 6.13 of the Texas
Insurance Code a makes the full amount of a fire policy a liquidated de-
mand against the insurer where there is a total loss by fire, but this pro-
vision expressly does not apply to personal property. It was therefore held
that when personal property is totally destroyed by fire, the face amount
of the policy does not constitute a liquidated demand unless the parties
have so contracted, which they had not done in this instance.
Construing Policy Provisions. In construing policy terms doubts were
resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer. In one case" the
"' Community Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 434 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1968).
4 Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Anglin, 433 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968).
49 American Exchange Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 433 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1968).
"
5 Brunson v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 407 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1969).
5' 4 3 6 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
5a435 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1968).
aTEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.13 (1963).
5 4 Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Howsley, 432 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
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insured testified that camping, fishing, and camera equipment were lost
when his rubber raft became lodged on a large rock in the middle of the
Rio Grande River and then was overturned by the wind. The policy ex-
cluded loss caused by "flood, surface water, waves, title [sic] water or title
[sic] wave, overflow of streams or other bodies of water . . . all whether
driven by wind or not."" The court found coverage, holding that the ques-
tion was not "what caused the goods to be lost?," but rather "what was the
cause of the boat capsizing?" 6 and that the answer was the wind. The
court said that the waters of the Rio Grande were not the kind referred
to in the exclusion and stated, "water was involved only as a recipient of
the goods when the raft capsized." 7 In a case involving the loss of a boat"
the court held that policy language covering loss in transit from "collision
and/or overturn of transporting land conveyance'"0 was broad enough to
include damages sustained when the boat trailer tipped, but did not over-
turn, and spilled the boat onto the highway.
However, where unambiguous language provided a policy defense, it
was enforced under a theft insurance policy. In Vanguard Insurance Co.
v. Stanfield" there was an exclusion of losses of personal property stolen
from premises owned, rented or occupied by the insured, unless stolen
while the insured was temporarily residing on such premises. It was held
that under such exclusion there was no coverage for property stolen from
premises which the insured owned, but on which he did not reside.
Accord and Satisfaction. A question of accord and satisfaction was re-
solved against the insured in Lloyds v. Burtner,' where fire destroyed the
contents of the insured's garage, including a boat, motor, and trailer. Under
the household goods extension of the policy, the insurance company was
liable for a maximum of ten per cent of the face value of the policy, or
$400; the household goods stored in the garage and destroyed had a value
of $1,113.75. The insurer admitted liability for $75 damage to drapery
in the dwelling under basic coverage, and $400 for the goods destroyed in
the garage under extension coverage, but it denied coverage on the boat,
motor, and trailer, and tendered a draft in the sum of $475, which had a
printed statement on the back that endorsement would constitute an
acknowledgment of full settlement, satisfaction, and compromise. Plaintiff
endorsed and cashed the draft and then brought suit for loss of the boat,
motor, and trailer. It was held that the draft was merely in the amount of
an undisputed and liquidated claim, so that the release was without con-
sideration insofar as the boat, motor, and trailer were concerned, and the
defense of accord and satisfaction failed.
11 Id. at 579.
51 Id. at 580.
57 Id.
sWashington Gen. Ins. Corp. v. King, 434 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968),
error dismissed.
5 Id. at 922.
60442 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
6'436 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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Mortgagee's Interest. Article 6.15 of the Texas Insurance Code" was
construed by the Fifth Circuit in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. United
States." The article provides that the interest of a mortgagee under a fire
policy cannot be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or
owner, or the happening of any condition beyond his control. In this case
the policy was cancelled because of the mortgagor's failure to make pre-
mium payments, with oral notice of this action given to the Small Business
Administration, the mortgagee. Thereafter, a fire occurred and the SBA
sued on the policy. It was held that article 6.15 required reasonable notice to
the mortgagee of impending cancellation, even though written notice was
given to the named insured, and that under the circumstances oral notice
was not reasonable notice.
IV. SURETY BONDS
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Southern Brokerage Co." suit was
brought against the surety on a broker's blanket bond for the expense of
successful defense of a suit. The supreme court determined that if a loss
had been sustained it would not have fallen under the terms of the bond
and therefore summary judgment for the surety was held to be proper.
In another complex surety bond situation, it was held that the surety com-
pany had as a matter of law clothed its agent with sufficient apparent
authority to execute surety bonds as to make the company liable, although
the agent did not have actual authority.'
e
2 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.15 (1963).
63407 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1969).
64443 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1969).
65Sharpstown State Bank v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1969), error granted.
[Vol. 24
